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NBA v. Williams,
45 F.3D 684 (2D Cm. 1995).
INTRODUCION
The National Basketball Association ("NBA"), a professional basketball orga-
nization, and the twenty-seven teams that are members of the NBA ("NBA
Teams") brought an action for declaratory judgement against a class of NBA
players, prospective NBA players, and the National Basketball Players Associa-
tion (collectively "players"). The NBA and the NBA Teams sought a declaration
that the continued application of several labor restraints did not violate federal
antitrust laws. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York ruled in favor of the NBA, declaring the continued implementation of the
restraints did not violate antitrust laws. On appeal, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, finding that the antitrust laws have no
application to the collective bargaining negotiations between the players and the
NBA Teams.
FACS
Plaintiff-appellee, NBA, organizes, markets and conducts a professional bas-
ketball league comprised of the co-plaintiffs, the twenty-seven member NBA
Teams. The defendants are a class of present and prospective professional bas-
ketball players and the National Basketball Players Association, the exclusive
bargaining representative of all present NBA players.
Since 1967, the NBA Teams, as a multiemployer bargaining unit, have bar-
gained with the Players Association. The parties have entered ten successive
collective bargaining agreements ("CBAs") during that time. The most recent
CBA began in 1988 and expired on June 23, 1994 (the "1988 CBA"), the day
following the last game of the 1993-94 NBA season. The NBA and the players
have extended the 1988 CBA to cover the 1994-1995 season while a new
agreement is negotiated. In negotiations over a new agreement, the players have
demanded that the NBA eliminate the three disputed provisions of the 1988
CBA, the "College Draft," the "Right of First Refusal," and the "Revenue Shar-
ing/Salary Cap System."
The College Draft apportions 54 eligible college players amongst the NBA
Teams. The order of selection is usually determined by the teams' previous-
season records with the worst teams selecting earlier. A player selected by a
team in the draft may negotiate with that team only. An undrafted player may
negotiate with any NBA team.
The Right of First Refusal creates a class of "Restricted Free Agents," those
players who have completed fewer than two contracts or have less than four
years of NBA experience. The Right of First Refusal lets an NBA team match
any salary offer made to one of its restricted free agents by another team and
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thereby retain that player.
The Revenue Sharing/Salary Cap System is a complex system which allocates
the gross revenue of a team between the players and the team owners on a fixed
percentage basis. The system also sets a minimum and maximum amount which
a team may spend on player salaries in a given year.
In order to expedite negotiation on a new CBA, the NBA Teams filed an
action in the Southern District of New York on June 17, 1994, seeking a declara-
tory judgment on the aforementioned restraints. The NBA sought two main dec-
larations. First, the NBA sought judgment that the contested restraints were not
violative of antitrust laws because their imposition was governed by labor laws
and the nonstatutory labor exemption to antitrust laws applied. Secondly, the
NBA sought a declaration that even if antitrust laws applied, the contested re-
straints survived under '!rule of reason" analysis.
After the NBA initiated the proceedings for a declaratory judgment, the play-
ers applied for and received a temporary restraining order ("TRO") prohibiting
the NBA Teams from entering into any contracts with any current or prospective
NBA players prior to the preliminary injunction hearing which was set upon the
granting of the TRO. The case was assigned to District Judge Duffy, who con-
solidated the preliminary injunction hearing with the trial on the merits pursuant
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a)(2). The trial was then conducted in one day on July 12,
1994. Judge Duffy found that the nonstatutory labor exemption to antitrust law
applied as long as a collective bargaining relationship existed. In addition, Judge
Duffy found that the restraints in question survived antitrust liability under the
rule of reason even if they were not exempt.
The players appealed the district court's declaration that the restraints were
not subject to federal antitrust laws. The players' appeal relied on the argument
that the NBA Teams have agreed jointly to impose the contested restrictions,
creating naked restraints that prevent competition, fix prices, and suppress sala-
ries.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit first looked to the players'
claim to determine the true issue at hand. It found that the players' claim was
grounded in classic antitrust principles, urging that multiemployer groups should
be barred from insisting upon, or using economic force to obtain the desired
terms of employment, as such conduct would constitute price-fixing. Since the
players conceded that the NBA Teams may act jointly regarding terms of em-
ployment where the players agree to those terms, the court of appeals found that
the players were basically contesting any joint conduct by the NBA Teams that
was beyond proposals made to the players union, and thereby decided by and
imposed or insisted upon unilaterally by the NBA Teams. The NBA offered the
same two-pronged defense it offered in district court, claiming that the restraints
were protected by the nonstatutory labor exemption to antitrust law, or, alterna-
tively, if antitrust law did not apply, that the restraints survived antitrust liability
under the rule of reason, whereby the competitive balance fostered by the chal-
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lenged provisions outweighed their restrictive consequences.
The court of appeals first addressed the players' claim by looking at the na-
ture and purposes of multiemployer bargaining. The unanimous panel of judges
turned to Charles D. Bonanno Linen Serv., Inc. v. NLRB' to determine that the
purposes of multiemployer bargaining include strengthening the employers' posi-
tion by taking away the union's ability to shut down individual employers one-
by-one, giving employers the ability to confront the union with a simultaneous
shutdown, eliminating competitive disadvantages resulting from each employer
reaching a different CBA with the union, eliminating multiple negotiations, and
allowing employers to make group benefit programs available. The judges then
went on to determine that multiemployer bargaining is even more important in
the sports industry because some of the terms and conditions of employment
must be standardized (e.g., scheduling, playoff structure, etc ...), requiring com-
mon rules and uniformity. The court, therefore, found that not allowing employ-
ers to agree on common terms and conditions of employment to be negotiated in
a new CBA, bargain hard over such terms, and ultimately insist upon them
would be in direct contravention with the core purpose of multiemployer bargain-
ing, which is allowing multiple employers to act as if they were a single employ-
er.
The Second Circuit then turned to how antitrust law affects multiemployer
bargaining, finding that the lack of case law challenging multiemployer bargain-
ing and the lack of congressional restriction on multiemployer bargaining com-
bine to show that Congress never intended multiemployer bargaining to be sub-
ject to the antitrust laws. Looking to the judiciary, the court found that in the 104
years since passage of the Sherman Antitrust Act (1890), the routine practices of
multiemployer bargaining have never been challenged in a case under the anti-
trust laws. The court of appeals inferred a general acceptance of the practice of
multiemployer bargaining from this lack of on-point cases. The court found
statutory protection of multiemployer bargaining under antitrust law by combin-
ing section four of the Norris-LaGuardia Act2 with section twenty of the Clayton
Act. Section four of the Norris-LaGuardia Act bars federal courts from issuing
injunctions against employers for employer organization activity. Section twenty
of the Clayton Act disallows federal intervention employer-employee disputes
even in the event of an employer lockout. The court read these two provisions
together to determine that multiemployer bargaining is exempted from antitrust
law, as both employer organization and employer action are allowed in disputes.
In addition to the statutory approval of multiemployer bargaining, the court
found that Congress' reluctance to pass any restrictive measures against
multiemployer bargaining suggests a general acceptance of such bargaining.
The court finally turned to the relationship between labor law and
multiemployer bargaining. Judge Winter began by stating that the players' con-
1. 454 U.S. 404, 409-10 (1982) (citing NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local Union No. 449, 353 U.S.
87, 96 (1957)).
2. 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1994).
3. 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1994).
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tentions were in direct conflict with the basic tenet that antitrust laws cannot be
used to subvert fundamental federal labor policy. The judges continued by noting
that multiemployer bargaining has been a feature of collective bargaining since
the dawn of unions, and that changing its essence now would require a "mas-
sive" reshaping of collective bargaining law and policy.
Furthermore, the appellate court found that the players were contesting the
continued imposition of the challenged restraints after the expiration of the 1988
CBA. However, the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") requires that em-
ployers maintain the status quo until an impasse is reached. Therefore, the play-
ers were viewing conduct required by the NLRA as illegal. The judges construed
this position as meaning that the players considered multiemployer bargaining to
be illegal. The court emphatically rejected any such claim, citing NLRB v. Truck
Drivers Local Union No. 449' in which the Supreme Court held that
multiemployer bargaining was valid because Congress debated its validity during
hearings on the Taft-Hartley amendments to the NLRA, during which proposals
were made to limit or outlaw multi-employer bargaining. Those proposals were
resoundingly rejected. The court found that this inaction-did not mean Congress
was waiting until a later date to address multiemployer bargaining, but that Con-
gress intended to leave regulation of multiemployer bargaining to the National
Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") because of its specialization in balancing com-
peting labor policy interests.
Finally, the Second Circuit addressed the players' claim that multiemployer
bargaining is a voluntary establishment and employers and unions should be free
to withdraw from the relationship at any time. The NLRB has previously held
that sports leagues are an exception to the voluntariness standard and that they
are required to bargain as joint employers. This NLRB holding was affirmed by
the Fifth Circuit in North American Soccer League v. NLRB.5 Therefore, any
argument that the NBA Teams are illegally compelled to bargain as a
multiemployer unit fails.
CONCLUSION
In affirming the district court, the court of appeals addressed, individually, the
application of both antitrust and labor law to multiemployer bargaining. The
court found that multiemployer bargaining was limited only by labor law, as
federal labor policy preempts antitrust concerns. Since Congress has never
viewed multiemployer bargaining as an antitrust problem, the court inferred a
lasting, uncodified assumption that multiemployer bargaining is not subject to
antitrust laws. The court found that the NLRB has held multiemployer bargaining
to be valid, and enhances the objectives of collective bargaining. Therefore, any
limits on multiemployer bargaining exist in labor laws alone, and antitrust laws
shall not apply.
Jeffrey Kosc
4. 353 U.S. at 95-96.
5. 613 F.2d 1379 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 899 (1980).
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